

TOP SECRET

25X1



7 September 1959

Copy No. C 63


25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 4.14.80 REVIEWER: [Signature]

25X1



25X1

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700060001-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700060001-3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 September 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China: American officials in Hong Kong speculate that a basic motive of the Communists in the Sino-Indian border and Laotian situations is to reverse setbacks in the past year which were greater than they are willing to accept. Increased Chinese military activity on the Sino-Indian border stems in part from a determination to consolidate Communist control over Tibet--an intention particularly evident in mop-up operations against Khamba rebels north of Assam. Communist activity in the Laotian situation, the officials feel, is an effort to restore losses sustained at the time of Vientiane's expulsion of the Pathet Lao from the government.

The officials discount the possibilities that the current tension in Asia is (1) part of a bloc effort to provide Khrushchev with a bargaining lever in his talks with President Eisenhower, (2) a deliberate Chinese move to embarrass the USSR because of China's opposition to an East-West rapprochement, or (3) a Chinese-sponsored external diversion for domestic purposes.

25X1



25X1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos: There are continuing reports that Communist pressure is increasing in both Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces. (South Vietnamese and Thai officials have indicated that neither is prepared at this time to intervene openly in Laos without US backing, but their views may change if the situation continues to worsen. Saigon, however, probably would like to introduce some forces and materiel into southern Laos covertly. Vientiane is holding in abeyance appeals to SEATO and the US for active military support, in case its request for UN intervention fails.) The chief of the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry's Information Department stated on 5 September that Vientiane's request for a UN Emergency Force is an "American move to interfere more deeply in Laos and prepare war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

25X1

25X1

25X1

7 Sept 59


DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

25X1



Japan: (Ambassador MacArthur reports that Prime Minister Kishi is clearly worried over the proposed trip to Peiping by former Prime Minister Ishibashi--particularly its effect on Japanese policy toward Communist China. Since the visit is primarily to "make headlines," Kishi is virtually certain that Ishibashi, on his return, will make harmful proposals urging closer economic and cultural ties with Peiping. He also fears that Ishibashi, who is in bad health, will be easily manipulated by the Communists.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

UAR-USSR: The controlled UAR press and radio have accused Pravda and Moscow radio of a "flagrant intervention" in the internal affairs of the UAR. These charges stem from recent Moscow rebroadcasts of anti-UAR articles in the Iraqi Communist press. Damascus radio threatened to retaliate by republishing Khrushchev's "eloquent and fluent admissions of crimes committed against humanity" during the Stalin regime--apparently a

7 Sept 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1 reference to Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th party congress in February 1956. UAR propaganda has also accused the Soviet Union of an attempt to isolate Iraq from the other Arab countries and of encouraging Communist agents in the Arab world. These renewed public recriminations, the first since last March, apparently have been brought about by Communist criticism of the UAR's continuing anti-Communist campaign. [REDACTED]



25X1

III. THE WEST

Belgium: The resignation of Congo Minister van Hemelrijck, which followed the refusal of the cabinet to approve his plan for a rapid evolution of self-government in the Belgian Congo, has further weakened the shaky Social Christian-Liberal party coalition of Premier Eyskens. Friction within the coalition over various issues has been growing since its formation in November 1958, and Eyskens adjourned Parliament in early July to avert a coalition crisis. The opposition Socialist party, which favors a more liberal Congo policy, is trying to exploit the resignation and may decide to push for new parliamentary elections. [REDACTED]

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700060001-3

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700060001-3

TOP SECRET